Monday, November 4, 2013

General Wesley Clark cross cutting with Jonathan Schell

while reading the Book of Jonathan Schell, the Seventh Decade, the New Shape of Nuclear Danger, numerous cross cutting observations, in relation to General Wesley Clark, were made. the below is a small sample of these observations:

"This new ambition was crystallized in a document that won brief notoriety and then, when Bush Sr. lost his bid for a second term, was forgotten. Its importance for the present is that it outlined a scheme for global dominance a decade before September 11, 2011. its sponsor was Cheney and its draftsman was Zalmay Khalilzad, who would become ambassador to Afghanistan in 2003 and of Iraq in 2005. The draft stated, "the number one objective of U.S.'s post-cold war political and military strategy should be preventing the emergence of a rival superpower. Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival." even strong regional powers should be suppressed, especially in areas "whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and the Southwest Asia." ambitions of others should, indeed, be nipped in the bud by convincing potential competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interest.". Accordingly, the United States "must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role"

"Rumsfeld's insistence on going to war with an army much smaller than the one recommended by high military officers appears to tell the same story. Rumsfeld has been excoriated for his decision , and the judgment that the number of troops was too few has been borne out."

"what is rarely asked is why Rumsfeld insisted on a small force. After all, we cannot suppose that he secretly wanted to fail in Iraq. One answer is that although the small force courted obvious risks, pointed out in advance by dissenting military officers, it was a requirement of the larger strategy of dominance, in which the Iraq war was to be but a first step."

"Doctrine (a guideline for policy) had clearly flowered into ideology (a comprehensive vision of History's progress and destination). Indeed, before long, Bush announced that he was engaged in an "ideological war". The men and women of his administration would not be the first to have sacrificed fact - both deliberately and unconsciously - to ideology. Like so many ideologues, they were too dazzled by their vision of the glorious future of their dreams to pay adequate attention to the sordid realities they were creating in the present."

"if we picture the world Bush and his advisers foresaw after the invasion of Iraq, it becomes clear that in their view global dominance was the best and probably the sole path to safety for the United States in the new age."